



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

***Thursday
15 July 1982***

NGA Review Completed

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
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
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
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IRAN-IRAQ: [REDACTED]

(Information as of 2300 EDT)

Iranian units have pushed a short distance into Iraq and may be trying to flank Iraqi forces. Iraqi units remain intact, and Iraqi aircraft apparently have bombed Iran's main oil export terminal at Khark Island. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Iranian forces have advanced at least 2 kilometers into Iraq along a narrow front about 25 kilometers north of the Shatt al Arab. [REDACTED]

Iraq claims to have raided Iran's major oil terminal at Khark Island yesterday. Baghdad warned it will continue attacking Khark Island as long as the Iranian offensive continues. [REDACTED]

Iranian press reports claim that heavy loss of life and property damage were inflicted yesterday during the Iraqi bombings of Kermanshah, Ilam, and Khorramabad. Iran claims Iraq also shelled the refinery at Abadan. [REDACTED]

Comment: A breakthrough of Iranian forces along the northeast flank of Iraqi defenses would leave Baghdad's forces in a precarious position. An Iranian advance on this axis would force Iraqi troops farther east to begin falling back toward Al Basrah. [REDACTED]

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Previous Iraqi attacks have done little damage to the oil facility at Khark Island. The Iraqi warning, however, is likely to inhibit foreign tankers from loading there. [REDACTED]

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Iranian Demands

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✓ Ayatollah Khomeini issued a statement yesterday calling on Iraqis to revolt. He addressed particularly the citizens of Al Basrah and Iraqi soldiers. At the same time, a Tehran radiobroadcast in Arabic told the Iraqis not to fear "threats from Saddam and his agents," because the Iranian forces "would not lay down their arms" until Saddam had been toppled. [REDACTED]

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Foreign Reactions

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In Moscow, TASS reported without comment yesterday accounts from both Iran and Iraq. In an apparent slight aimed at Tehran, however, it noted Tehran's rejection of the UN Security Council's unanimous resolution on Monday calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal to international boundaries. [REDACTED]

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③ POLAND: Party Central Committee Plenum

The long-delayed plenum on youth that begins today will contain little that is new for the alienated and dispirited younger generation, but it offers Premier Jaruzelski an occasion to outline his program for reducing martial law restrictions.

Widespread speculation persists that the regime will announce the release of some or all internees or the modification of martial law.

disputes between hardliners and reformers on a variety of subjects, including the release of internees, have led to reversals of numerous decisions. there is general agreement among the leaders that the squabbles cannot be allowed to continue and that both sides seem prepared for a conclusive battle at the plenum.

Observers at the Vatican say Pope John Paul II has decided that political conditions are not right for a visit to Poland in August. The Pope will ask the Polish leaders for an alternative date.

Comment: Jaruzelski probably has been under pressure from moderates to announce conciliatory gestures to persuade Western governments to cancel economic sanctions. The Premier's aversion to taking risks and pressure from hardliners at home and in Moscow, however, are likely to cause him to make only modest, symbolic gestures that leave the essentials of martial law unchanged.

Despite the many failings of martial law, Jaruzelski's critics probably do not have enough strength to mount a frontal attack on him at the plenum. There could be increased criticism, however, of the continuing drift.

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⑩ SPECIAL ANALYSES

USSR-IRAN-IRAQ: Soviet Views of the Invasion

5 Moscow opposes Iran's invasion of Iraq, but it is unlikely to take any decisive military moves to deter the Iranians. The Soviets fear ruining their chances for future gain in Iran. []

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5 The USSR voted on Monday in favor of the UN Security Council resolution for an immediate cease-fire. This drew an unusual public rebuke of Moscow from Iranian Prime Minister Musavi. []

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Before the invasion, Soviet radiobroadcasts to Iran criticized Iranian calls for an expansion of the war. []

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Conflicting Interests

5 Despite their concern, the Soviets could derive some advantages from the conflict. They would welcome the downfall of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who has been moving steadily away from them, and any instability in conservative Persian Gulf states that Iranian predominance in the region might produce. []

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4 On the other hand, Saddam's replacement by a pro-Iranian figure would further undermine Soviet influence in Iraq and make the clerical government in Tehran even less susceptible to Soviet inroads. Soviet officials have said the USSR has no interest in seeing the spread of Iranian-style revolution near its southern border and is particularly opposed to the establishment of a fundamentalist regime in Baghdad. []

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5 Moreover, Iraq and the USSR are nominal allies, and have signed a friendship and cooperation treaty. Following the defeat in Lebanon of Syria and the PLO, the defeat of Iraq would deal another blow to the Soviets' image and position in the Middle East. []

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Possible Responses

5 If the invasion bogs down, or if the Iranians limit it to the Al Basrah region, the Soviets probably will continue arms deliveries to both sides and might attempt to promote a mediated settlement. The USSR is unlikely to provide major support to Iraq, however, even if the Iranians were to advance on Baghdad. []

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5 Moscow has the option of significantly increasing its weapons deliveries to Iraq as well as cutting off arms deliveries to Iran and transit of Iranian imports through the USSR. The Soviets also could employ Syria to urge restraint on Iran and issue private and implicit public warnings to Tehran to desist. []

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4 Such moves, however, would not decisively help the Iraqis and would anger the Iranians. The Iraqis already have a surplus of weapons, and Tehran is not likely to listen to verbal appeals from any quarter. []

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Military Action Unlikely

5 Although the USSR has the ability to undertake military moves of its own against Iran, such action seems unlikely. Movement of Soviet combat forces to Iraq or publicized maneuvers on the Soviet-Iranian border might act as a psychological deterrent on Tehran but would not stop a determined Iranian offensive. In addition, a rapid Iranian breakthrough would put the Soviets in the unwelcome position of either employing the forces they sent--which they would want to avoid--or suffering the embarrassment of withdrawal. []

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5 More important, such military moves would destroy Moscow's prospects for future gains in Iran. Despite the failure of the USSR's efforts to court Tehran since the fall of the Shah, it apparently still considers Iran a greater geopolitical prize than Iraq. []

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5 At the same time, providing military backing to Iraq would antagonize Syria, which is a much more important ally of the USSR. Damascus would particularly resent it in light of Soviet passivity in the crisis in Lebanon. []

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5 The leadership situation in Moscow also might make this an inopportune time for adventurous moves. President Brezhnev's declining stamina and evidence that succession politicking is under way could make achieving a consensus in the Politburo on military involvement all the more difficult. []

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5 If Moscow's political efforts fail to deter an Iranian offensive deep into Iraq, the Soviets probably will try to make the best of an unwelcome situation and minimize strains with Tehran. They will play up any US military moves or support for Iraq to win favor with Tehran. The Soviets would hope that an Iranian-installed regime in Baghdad would not last long and that Iraq's heavy dependence on Soviet weaponry would eventually help them to rebuild their ties with Iraq. []

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